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LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM*  
 
The Rights of Future Generations, and Representing 
them in the Present 
 
 
Abstract. The Védegylet, a civic organisation for environment protection presented 1990 
a private draft for an Act on the Ombudsman of Future Generations. In this article the 
author of the Draft Law describes the background to the Law. After a short survey of the 
development of the idea of a guardian of future generations in international law the 
author discusses whether future generations can have “rights” and whether future interests 
can be anticipated. The article raises structural questions of the proposed ombudsman 
(who represent whom, before what institution) and points out the differences between the 
existing ombudsmen defending individual rights and the speaker of future generations, 
the latter being rather a representative of environmental interests and a mediator. Finally 
the author shows how the Hungarian Constitutional Court created favourable conditions 
for introducing the new institution. 
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When former students reunite to pay their tribute to the memory of their 
Master, they bear testimony to the fact that Gyula Eörsi’s work lives on 
and is transmitted to future generations not only in the books he wrote but 
also in the memory of the members of the school of jurisprudence he once 
headed, their work and the personal affection that many of them still 
cherish. Once again, it is Professor Eörsi’s spirit that is able, if only for a 
moment, to conjure up the scholarly community, which used to be His 
intellectual home as well as ours. The atmosphere was at once imbued with 
the strength of personal example, which counterbalanced the lack of a 
“director”, with the cult of originality and performance. All this was 
supported by the practice of reading and commenting on every sketch and 
piece of work we did, a general tenor of detachment tinged with irony, and 
still some rare heart-to-heart conversations with the Boss about the role 
that he had chosen as his life mission. 

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   Personally, I am particularly indebted to Gyula Eörsi. After my first 
publications he declared me a “private scholar”, giving me dispensation 
from participating in the collective projects of the Institute. I could pursue 
whatever interest I came to have. (In those days we would have added that 
this was happening in machtgeschützte Innerlichkeit). On one exceptional 
occasion, he asked me—“a man of leisure”, as he put it—to write an essay 
for the collection of papers on environmental law, which was imposed on 
the Institute as an obligatory exercise. Little did I, or anyone, know that this 
paper was to involve me in the movement for environmental protection 
and to be the source of instituting an unlimited access for everyone to the 
Constitutional Court. This actio popularis deeply influenced the entire style 
of the political transformation of 1989. I find it most appropriate to express 
my gratitude by publishing in this volume another offshoot of that 
felicitous imposition rather than a paper on a freely chosen topic. 
 
1. The idea of a speaker for the environment and the future generations 
entered the public opinion in Hungary in connection with two events: 
directly on the occasion of debates on introducing the institution of the 
ombudsman in Hungary, and indirectly through international law. In 
conclusion to his book on the 'ombudsman' (of 1992), László Majtényi reflects 
upon arguments that came up around the change of regimes, formulating a 
demand for an ombudsman to represent each and every right and interest, from 
the disadvantaged, through hospitalised patients to prisoners and also the 
environment. Majtényi pointed out that an environmental ombudsman differs 
from other parliamentary commissioners who defend a concrete, and already 
acknowledged right. The role of the environmental ombudsman would 
focus on the safeguarding and representing general environmental interests, 
rather than defending individual rights. Consequently, he/she is a mediator. 
However these thoughts were not taken up. The problem that the right to a 
healthy environment lacks in an individual subject was left to the Constitutional 
Court to interpret, and to draw consequences from. The Constitutional Court 
also discussed the nature of the right to life. In both cases the verdicts took 
a line favourable to introduce a commissioner for future generations into 
the Hungarian legal system, even though the Constitutional Court itself 
was not concerned with this. 
 Important events in international law occurred in the meanwhile. At 
the 1992 Rio Conference, the representative of Malta made the case for a 
guardian of future generations, whose role would be to keep our sense of 
responsibility to the future generations alive. A number of scientific groups 
adopted the suggestion, producing a profusion of literature on the subject, 
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which brought all the related theoretical and practical problems to the 
fore. International law is better suited to incubate such plans and to solve 
its problems, as its distance from political life does not allow for the 
exploitation of these problems for everyday politics. But no official sign 
of any State’s willingness to institutionalise the guardian has been given. 
The development of the law shows however a clear trend. The thought, 
that mankind as whole can be the subject of international law has gained 
ground. International law has brought about the concept of “the common 
concerns of mankind,” as well as “the common heritage of mankind.” Though 
the institution of a commissioner has not been accepted, the UNESCO 
issued a declaration on the responsibility of the present generation towards 
future generations in 1997. Guaranteeing the freedom of choice to those 
who come after us is the theme of this declaration, and it states the 
responsibilities of our generation in regards to the protection and handing 
over of a heritage in the fields not only of our environment in its 
traditional sense, but also that of biological diversity, the human gene, and 
cultural heritage. 
 In spite of these developments advance has been made largely in the 
theoretical fields. Apart from taking its own professional stance on the 
subject, international law has placed the idea of the guardian of future 
generations within the current theories of justice, and introduced it into 
debates on democracy, posing it as a question of participation, that is the 
future taking part in the decision making today. The question was raised, 
whether we should have to make concrete choices in the name of future 
generations  (representing them), or whether we must make sure they will 
have the opportunity to make a choice once they are born. Would in not be 
better to save certain goods and to hand them down to the future generation 
instead of “representing” them? (As is commonly understood, whales and 
rain forests are such 'goods' today.)  
 
2. How can the legal personality of future generations be recognised, 
taking their uncertain notion? It is evident to a student of private law that 
anyone or anything can be given legal personality; if these are not 
individuals or natural persons, than legal entities are legal subjects. The 
subjects of international law however could originally only be states. Steps 
away from this position have been taken in two directions: individuals can 
also be subjects of international law (see the example of the war criminals 
brought to trial in the Hague), and in the opposite instance, mankind—as a 
whole—can also be legal subject in international law, having respecting 
rights. 
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 The question, which may help to elucidate the status of future generations 
as legal persons is, what kind of rights would they provided with? It is 
appropriate to look at the “rights” we believe future generations deserve 
as symbolic, and to think of the legal discussion dealing with them as 
metaphoric. What is present for us today of the future rights of those who 
are yet to be born, is the responsibility, the legal obligations we have towards 
them. International law assumes that future generations have “rights” in 
order to establish corresponding duties, for all rights are balanced by 
obligations. (We will see that according to the Hungarian Constitution the 
State may have responsibilities towards future generations, without giving 
them rights.) We are the ones who decide the rights of humankind in the 
future, based on our ideas, knowledge and needs. Respect for their 
autonomy requires that we make as few essential decisions for them as 
possible, passing on the freedom of choice instead. 
 The indefinable notion of future generations—especially in terms of 
time—shall warn us not to handle instead of the unborn generations. Lets 
hope there will always be future generations—but how far can we look 
ahead, and take responsibility for the future? What time limit can we claim, 
for our decisions to be proved correct and justifiable? Two points of conflict 
come up when we base our responsibilities and duties on social justice. 
 First we have to negotiate the clash of interests between present and 
future generations. What weight must we give the rights of the future 
generations, to place it over and above the poverty, and indeed life threatening 
circumstances (e.g. hunger in Africa) of generations alive today, belittling 
the later, and putting the future forward as the more important? The 
interests of the future generations cannot be brought up in itself, separated 
from the solidarity and responsibility for all of mankind in the present. 
We can find some amusing examples in the literature: if it has been 
discovered that a comet will hit the earth in two hundred years, a certain 
percentage of the global GDP must be set aside throughout those years, to 
avert the catastrophe, and everyone must accept this pledge. The inclusion 
of rights of the future generation in the legal system is justified through 
democracy. But who is to decide, what load should be born by whom in 
the name of the future? 
 The other controversial point is a clash of interests between future 
generations. A similar choice may come up between the fourth and fifth 
generations, or the fifth and the tenth. A beneficial decision for the next 
five generations may be lethal to the sixth. And why should all interests be 
global. Something beneficial to future Siberians and Alaskans can spell 
catastrophe in South-Asia. We may be able to bring sacrifices and even 
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force others to make sacrifices in order to save a species, but a virus it 
carries may wipe out future generations. For these reasons Rawls, a 
leading authority in social justice theory writes that we can only extend 
our guardianship to the next generation. One can put in the balance benefits to 
one's self, ones contemporaries and the future within the limits posed by 
this view. It is natural that we look after our own children—there is no 
need to go any further. Yet decisions made today, affect many generations 
to come—can a fair decision be taken without considering them? 
 “Goods” being conserved for future generations, rather than the anti-
cipation of their rights and interests may partly solve the problems outlined 
above. This has a serious impact on the way the institution is built up. 
 
3. Who represents whom, and before what court or authority? And how 
many ombudsmen shall we say are needed? The answer to the question put 
forward in the previous point—whether “goods” are to be saved or actions 
in the name of the future generations to be made—will define the way the 
institution of the ombudsman will be structured. If the speaker is a guardian 
of future generations in general, than the person would have to be knowl-
edgeable in all fields, but essentially someone universally respected on moral 
grounds. (Yet is the moral authority of the person and universal respect 
enough? Will everybody bow to his/her position on a controversial subject 
such as abortion, or population explosion? Nothing affects the rights of 
the future generations and especially their right to life more than these both 
problems.) But if the protection of particular goods, i.e. certain objects such 
as the oceans or the whales is at stake, than an expert who can tell what is 
best for a whale is needed. In this case, we need as many speakers, as the 
number of protected goods. Who should be the speakers: a person or an 
institution, a State, a public authority or a NGO? Where should the platform 
be given for this speaker: should he/she make his/her case to the nation-
states, international institutions, to both or neither, bringing the case instead 
before a court? (Though would the process then no longer be the represen-
tation of certain interests, but an enforcement of rights.) And as we proceed, 
one feels more and more lost in a maze of questions. Even the question of 
how an ombudsman would relate—in terms of prestige—to the organisations 
already at work has come up. After all, every organisation in the field will 
claim to be serving the interests of future generations. Nor can it be 
argued that people working on stopping a virus (even in a single country or 
region) will not influence the well being of generations in the future. Another 
factor to be reckoned with is the claims of established ombudsmen who 
may feel that a speaker of future generations will trespass on their field of 
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competence. And governments may see the new ombudsman as another 
attempt to limit their powers. 
 Following these structural questions, we can address the problems of 
the powers of the guardian of the future generations, and the nature of 
his/her activity. 
 The role of this ombudsman is different from that of all others. For this 
reason this office does not involve any competition with commissioners of 
civil rights and data protection. The later protect the constitutional rights 
of the individual: clearly defined rights in a legal process that is also clearly 
defined. It must be mentioned, that presently the only environmental ombuds-
man of the world, employed in Ontario Canada, has the responsibilities 
traditionally associated with the ombudsman, helping citizens fight for 
their environment related rights. A speaker for the future generations 
however, as I have said, will not be defending legal rights, but will have 
the office of representation. The term guardian, used in international law, 
makes its mark for this reason. Minors and those unable to take action in 
their own name have guardians. Future generations are not able to make a 
case for themselves, and therefore the speaker must do it in their name. 
On the one hand, the guardian helps to bring the issues touching on them 
to the legal recourse. On the other hand, the guardian influences the 
political decision making, as a representative, as well as by using public 
pressure. The fact must be stressed that the speaker for the future genera-
tions is not a decision maker. He/She seeks to orient the politics of 
decision makers. This may also be considered a weakness. But the symbolic 
“rights” of the future generations are quite different from the fundamental 
constitutional rights protected by other ombudsmen. The other ombuds-
men are not authorities either; their recommendations take effect with a 
measure of the strength of the argument and the publicity given to it, and 
the personal prestige of the ombudsman. A smaller role is being proposed 
for the guardian of the next generations in the literature of international 
law: the right to speak out for the future generations—and of course full 
access to information. The Hungarian draft law for the setting up of the 
institution of a parliamentary ombudsman for future generations, which I 
prepared at the request of Védegylet, a civic organisation for the 
environment, goes to the limits of what is possible.1 Half-way between the 
Canadian and the Hungarian conception lies the Israeli parliamentary ombuds-
man whose office was created after the publication of the Hungarian draft, 

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and who is empowered to undertake preliminary norm control from the 
legal point of view of future generations.  
 
4. Why am I convinced that the situation in Hungary is conducive to the 
establishment of this institution, in spite of all the questions we have left 
open, and all the apparent difficulties? Firstly the legal environment is 
suited for the introduction of such an ombudsman. Secondly I trust, that 
both public opinion and lawmaking bodies recognise our responsibilities to 
future generations. The story of data protection, and its commissioner 
gives some cause for circumspect optimism. It has taken twenty years to 
reach from the conception of integrated records, ready plans for registers on 
the population, and the general acceptance of the personal identification 
number to the declaration of the fundamental right of informational self-
determination by the Constitutional Court in 1991, the establishing the 
office of the data commissioner, and the conscious everyday use of information 
rights. Our cause may run a similar course if we come to be aware of our 
responsibilities towards the generations of the future, and the attention of 
decision-makers is constantly drawn to the issue. 
 The present legal background is favourable, because the Constitutional 
Court has declared the state’s duty to protect the condition of life for 
future generations. The Court also solved the question of how future 
generations can be a subject of law, a question that caused some difficulty 
in the international legal theory.2 The Constitutional Court has dealt with 
this question in all of its sentences that had anything to do with life and 
death: abortion and death penalty. According to the judgement of the 
court, right to life, which is a basic individual right, stands balanced 
against the obligation of the State, to protect life. The duty of the State 
goes beyond its obligation not to violate the individual’s right to life. It 
must also protect human life and its condition of existence in general. This 
latter duty is qualitatively different from aggregating the rights to life of 
individuals; it is human life in general, consequently human life as a value 
that is the subject of protection. Hence, the State’s duty to protect human 
life extends to those lives, which are in their formation, just as it extends 
to the protection of living conditions of future generations. In 1998, the 
Constitutional Court put particular emphasis on the fact that not only 
individual rights must be brought under legal protection, but life and its 

 
2
 For the relevant decisions and further explanation see Sólyom, L.—Brunner, 
G.: Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional 
Court. Arbor, A.: The University of Michigan Press, 2001. 
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natural conditions must be institutionally protected beyond this given 
circle, i.e. the protection of the right to life does not only apply to the 
rights of (now living) individuals. The Constitutional Court has therefore 
declared that these objective duties of the state always extend beyond 
insuring the rights of the individual. Every person has the right to the 
freedom of speech. The responsibility of the State is to create and sustain 
the conditions that enable the formation of and upkeep democratic public 
opinion. Therefore the State is for example limited to a few, well-defined 
cases as regards the penalisation of the expression of an opinion or is 
obliged to pass a Media Act. In other words, we have here a rather extensive 
and impersonal protection of rights through institutions. With a similar 
reasoning from the right to life follows that the State is responsible for the 
protection of the environment and the living conditions of future 
generations. Environmental rights are concentration of duties of the State, 
according to the Constitutional Court. When we consider this responsibility, 
we may speak of corresponding “rights” only in symbolic terms: as the 
Court put it, nature itself could be the beneficiary of this right. So is no need 
to use the language of “the rights of animals and plants.” We might however 
add: there is a need to bring up the question of whether the future 
generations have rights or not, because it is valuable as strong propaganda. 
 
5. The Hungarian legislative draft I have mentioned was published a year 
ago. Since the theoretical difficulties in connection with the future genera-
tions are avoidable in Hungary only practical objections were raised and 
discussed. The ombudsman of future generations will be modelled on the 
parliamentary ombudsmen who are already established. The question we 
may expect will come up is: why is a new institution needed when so 
many seem to be dealing with these problems already? According to the 
draft, the commissioner for the future generations would have the powers to 
conduct examinations in the private sector as well (similarly to the data 
protection commissioner), while the general ombudsman is only able to 
examine State institutions. For this reason, the field of work planned for 
our ombudsman would not be fully accessible to the general ombudsman. 
The numerous authorities that look after the rights of our descendants as one 
among their many duties would also not be able to replace the speaker for 
the future generations. These are government agencies, acting in the strict 
framework of their competences, duties and procedural rules. In contrast, 
the ombudsman for the future generations has a free hand in the selection 
of cases to be dealt with, which she/he believes to be most important in terms 
of representing the future generations, drawing not only the attention of 
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various authorities to the matters, and making his/her case with them, but 
also the attention of the general public, giving the sense of responsibility a 
chance to develop. An actio popularis completes the institution: any person 
can put in a motion for an investigation. 
 The draft act does not limit the powers of the parliamentary commis-
sioner of the future generations to environmental protection. The tasks of 
the commissioner cannot however be defined without reference to the 
Environmental Protection Act and the Natural Conservation Act. These in 
turn refer to a number of areas from the cultural environment and protected 
historical buildings and monuments to education. The field of investigation 
and activity for the ombudsman is very wide. Apart from the right to a choice 
in matters related to nature, the UNESCO declaration of 1997 mentioned 
earlier lists cultural, political and economic choice among the opportunities 
for decision that must be saved for the future generations. In the preamble to 
draft act all these are included; freedom of choice, quality of life, free access 
to energy resources; these are areas to which the powers of the ombudsman 
are extended. While the commissioner is invested with the powers to investi-
gate these legally definable fields, the office is never itself an authority. The 
powers of the parliamentary commissioner for the future generations are 
built on publicity, influence and pressure. He/she has the right to call for a 
public hearing, to give counsel on international obligations concerning the 
common heritage and the common concern of mankind, nature or environ-
mental protection and resources, prior to entering them. Neither State, nor 
business secrets can hinder the commissioner’s access to data related to the 
state of the environment.  
 As the cause of the guardian was not embraced by the States after 
1992, the Hungarian political establishment rejected the proposal for the 
institution of an ombudsman for future generations. That the draft law 
made its way to Parliament and reached the stage of committee discussion 
was itself the result of political manoeuvring. However, government and 
opposition were of the same opinion: there were enough ombudsmen already. 
Yet if we come to think of the number of years it took the cause of data 
protection to get from official resistance to constitutional recognition and to 
the institution of the independent ombudsman for data protection, we have 
no reason to give up hope. 
 
 
